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Using a unique dataset of 703,287 farm operators from the Taiwanese Census of 
Agriculture merged to administrative records from the National Farmers' Health 
Insurance (FHI) program, we examine the effects of the enrollment in the FHI 
program on farmers’ on- and off-farm labor supply and the amount of land they 
allocate to Taiwan’s land retirement program. In order to account for non-random 
self-selection into the FHI we use a matching procedure to estimate the impact of the 
program on land and labor allocations. Our results indicate that participation in the 
FHI increases (decrease) on (off) farm labor supply, and decreases the amount of land 
enrolled in the land retirement program. Our findings have implication for health care 
reforms that have been initiated in other countries, and the United States in particular.   
 




Health care and social policy reforms are being initiated in many countries 
throughout the world, including the United States. For example, the Obama 
Administration has enacted reforms to provide access to health care for all Americans. 
Recent studies have explored the possible impacts of a national health insurance 
programs on population health (e.g., Holtz-Eakin 2011; Kenneth and Theodore 2011), 
but little is known about the impact on farmers. 
Compared to other socio-demographic groups, universal health insurance and 
social insurance are more important to farm households in the U.S. for several reasons. 
Many farmers are self-employed, and as a result, must purchase health, life, and 
disability insurance in the individual market where premiums are significantly higher, 
and insurance companies are able to deny coverage to individuals considered “bad 
risks”. These access problems are reinforced by that fact that farm production is 
relatively risky (both in terms of income and health) compared to other job categories, 
further reinforcing the tendency of insurers to raise premiums and limit insurance 
offers. This is one reason why access to health insurance has been used in past studies 
as an indicator of the overall economic well-being of farm households (Jones et al, 
2009).  
In order to improve health care access some farmers have entered into 4 
 
cooperative agreements with others in order to purchase insurance on the group 
market where premiums are significantly lower due to better risk pooling and the 
lower administrative costs associated with underwriting policies for larger groups of 
insures. Some states have also facilitated the purchase of insurance through state Farm 
Bureaus. Although these efforts have helped to reduce rates of uninsurance among 
U.S. farmers below other self-employed individuals, they are still higher than for the 
general population (Zheng and Zimmer, 2008). 
Furthermore, many farmers in the U.S. work off the farm to gain fringe benefits 
that include health and other forms of insurance at reasonable costs. In particular, 
Jensen and Salant (1985) found that the availability of fringe benefits from off-farm 
employment was positively associated with off-farm labor hours. Gripp and Ford 
(1997) examined the association between farm characteristics and the health insurance 
coverage and found that 20% of farm managers did not have health insurance. Of 
those that did have coverage, only 67% acquired it through their farm business.     
It is also common for the spouses of farmers to seek off-farm employment, in 
part to gain access to health insurance for themselves and their family members. 
Using the 1996-2001 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Zheng and 
Zimmer (2008) found that 45% of farmers covered by employment-based health 
insurance were not the actual policy holders, and that 90% of these non-policy holders 5 
 
had a spouse with employer-sponsored coverage. They also found, after controlling 
for selection into health insurance coverage, that uninsurance in farm household 
significantly reduced the utilization of medical services. Using a household survey 
from Taiwan, Liao and Taylor (2010) found that the de-coupling of health insurance 
from employment brought about by the introduction of a National Health Insurance 
program in 1995 reduced the likelihood that wives in farm households worked 
off-farm by between 9.6 and 13.6 percentage points.     
  We use data from Taiwan in our empirical investigation of the impact of health 
and social insurance programs on the labor supply and land allocation decisions of 
farm households. This issue is of particular policy interest in Taiwan. Although the 
FHI successfully alleviates financial barriers farmers face accessing medical services 
and provides other social security benefits for a modest level of cost-sharing, a budget 
deficit occurred after implementation of the program that grew to NT$120 million in 
2008 (COA, 2009). Balancing the FHI budget has therefore become a priority for the 
Health Department of Taiwan.   
Despite the need to contain the costs of the FHI, policy makers must consider it 
effects on the welfare of older farmers and its impact of the agricultural industry 
before moving forward with reforms. The average age of Taiwanese farmers reached 
61.2 in 2005, which means that many are eligible for FHI pensions are likely to 6 
 
                                                      
increase their rate of medical care utilization as they age. In addition, the amount of 
land enrolled in the set-aside program increased to 239,747 hectares in 2004, which is 
approximate equal to the total cultivate land area in 2004 (237,351 hectares). To 
formulate broad based agricultural policy reforms the government needs to know 
whether land set asides are sensitive to farmers’ participation in the FHI. 
  We are also motivated by the desire to provide empirical estimates that can be 
used to predict the impact of PPACA on U.S. farmers. Because PPACA will 
fundamentally change the structure of health insurance markets in the U.S. over the 
next several years, historical data are of limited use in predicting PPACA’s wide 
reaching effects.
1 An alternative approach is to consider programs in other countries 
that are similar to the future reforms written into PPACA.     
The Farmers Health Insurance (FHI) program in Taiwan contains several features 
that are similar to these reforms. In particular, the coupling of FHI premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies with universal coverage administered through Taiwan’s 
National Health Insurance (NHI) program, are the very similar to PPACA’s premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies for low-to-middle income families that are tied to health 
insurance plans made universally available to the plans individuals without employer 
sponsored coverage will be able to purchase through Health Insurance Exchanges.   
 
1  Many of PPACA’s provisions are either phased-in gradually, or do not take effect until 2014. 7 
 
Given that median family income of farmers in the U.S. was $54,000 in 2007 
($58,320 in 2011 dollars), we estimate that well over half of U.S. farmers will qualify 
for these subsidies (USDA, 2010; Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). Farmers will also 
qualify for additional insurance subsidies in the form of small business tax credits.     
  To analyze the impact of enrollment in the FHI we make use of a unique dataset 
of 703,287 farm operators from Taiwan’s Agricultural Census merged to 
administrative data from the FHI program. This large scale population-based survey 
provides us sufficient power to precisely estimate the impact of FHI enrollment on 
labor supply and land allocation decision. Another distinct advantage of these data is 
that health insurance status of each farmer is validated using the administrative data 
rather than self-reported. This is important because past research has shown that 
health insurance status is often measured with significant error in survey data, and that 
such measurement error can have a large impact on econometric estimates (Kreider 
and Hill, 2009). 
While the variable we construct to indicate enrollment in the FHI program is 
measured without error, it is still possibly endogenous in any labor supply or land 
allocation model. This is because there are unobservable factors, such as unmeasured 
health status or risk aversion, that are correlated both with FHI enrollment and these 
outcome variables. To overcome the endogeneity problem we use a coarse matching 8 
 
method to effectively generate a control group of farmers that is similar along 
observable dimensions to the treatment group that enrolls in the FHI. In so doing, we 
significantly reduce the potential for endogeneity bias in our treatment effect 
estimates. 
Taiwan’s Farmer's Health Insurance Program   
The Farmers’ Health Insurance Program (FHI) is a supplementary health 
insurance program for farmers, which has been administered by the government of 
Taiwan since 1989. The FHI was the first government sponsored health insurance in 
Taiwan, and was designed to both increase the health and welfare of farmers and to 
promote stability in rural areas. FHI coverage is mandatory for members of farmers’ 
associations, and other farmers above 15 year of age can electively enroll in the 
program. 
Upon enrolling in the FHI farmers receive a favorable premium-benefit ratio and 
a premium subsidy. In particular, FHI enrolless pay only 30% of health insurance 
premiums levied at 2.55% of total benefits, whereas public sector and private sector 
employees have pay 40% of premiums levied at 7.15% of total benefits, and 30% of 
premiums levied at 5.5% of total benefits (Chiang, 1997). In addition to the subsidies 
in medical services, FHI enrollees receive lump sum payments for maternity, 
disability, and death as well as a pension upon turning 65 years old. When the FHI 9 
 
                                                      
reaches 65, they are eligible to receive a lump sum monthly payment of NT$ 6,000. 
Since the inauguration of the National Health Insurance (NHI) program in 1995, 
all of the medical care services provided to FHI enrollees have been administered 
through the NHI.
2 The cost of per doctor visit is same for each resident regardless of 
the type of the FHI health insurance status. However, the lump-sum cash payments in 
the form of maternity subsidies, disability compensation, and funeral allowance 
continued to be administered through the FHI. Program enrollees also continued to 
benefit from premium subsidies. In 2007, according to the official report by the 
Council of Agriculture, there were 1.6 million individuals enrolled in the FHI. 
Taiwan’s Land Retirement Program 
  In response to the requirements imposed by World Trade Organization (WTO) to   
decrease domestic rice subsidies, the Taiwanese government in 2002 launched a land 
set-aside program called the “Rice Paddy Utilization Adjustment Program” (RPUAP). 
The RPUAP is similar to the land set-aside program in the European Union and the 
Conservation Reserve Program in the United State. In particular, farmers have an 
option of voluntarily setting their land aside in return for compensation in the form of 
 
2  A considerable number of studies have examined the effects of the implementation of the NHI on 
general population (e.g., Chou and Staiger 2001; Chou, Liu, and Hammitt 2003), and on the farm 
households in Taiwan (Liao and Taylor 2010). All of these used the Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure (SFIE). Because the SFIE is designed for general population, it does not contain much 
information on the farm characteristics, and as a result, is not suitable for our analysis.   an annual direct payment of NT$ 45,000 per hectare. In 2006, the total fallow land in 
the RPUAP had reached 215,668 hectares.   
Theoretical Framework 
To guide our empirical specification, we construct a simple theoretical framework that 
combines the agricultural household model (e.g., Ahearn et al., 2006; Huffman 1991; 
Lass et al., 1991; Singh et al., 1986) and health care demand model (Cameron et al. 
1988; Zheng and Zimmer, 2008). We assume a standard farm household with an 
operator with fixed time endowment  T . He/she has to decide how to allocate the 
total available time between leisure  , farm production,  , and off-farm work, 
. In addition to the time constraint, a constraint for land area is imposed. The farm 




A between  farm 
production, A, and land enrolled in the land set-aside program, As with per hectare 
payment pA. Household income is earned from off-farm work at the wage rates, w, and 
from sales of the agricultural product at price pf , produced with on-farm labor and 
operated land in accordance with a well-behaved (concave) production function, 
(, )
F f LA . 
Further, denote the fixed wealth endowment of the farm household as  E . 
Following the specification in Cameron et al. (1988), the health status of the farm 
operator, H, is determined by the health production function (Becker 1965, Grossman 
10 
 1972) defined over medical care utilization, M, and uncertain health state (or event) s. 
Each farmer does know their future health status but has a prior probability 
distribution over future states, defined as (| ) sK π , where K are demographic 
characteristics. We also assume j indicates the insurance status j, where (j = 1 
indicates FHI enrollment and j = 0 denotes non-enrollment; Pj represents the 
insurance premium paid by the farmer, so if the farmer does not enroll in the FHI, Pj = 
0, otherwise Pj is greater than 0. PM is the price per unit of health care service, and Bj 
is the supplement benefit of the FHI program.   
  If there is a single composite commodity of consumption goods, x, with unitary 
price, the farm household is assumed to maximize utility by choosing the levels of 
labor used for off-farm    and on-farm production  , medical care utilization 
(M), and the amount of land allocated to the land retirement program (A
S). The farm 
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Finding an analytical solution to the maximization problem in Eq. (1) is complicated 
because of the health state s is unknown. Following Cameron et al. (1988) and Zheng 
and Zimmer (2008), this maximization problem can be solved as a two-stage process. 
11 
 In the first stage, before the farmer's future health status is known, the farmer decides 
whether to enroll in the FHI and then in the second stage, after his health status has 
been revealed, he chooses an optimal level of health care consumption, on- and 
off-farm labor supply, and land allocation. If we solve the second stage-problem first, 
the optimal solutions for the endogenous variables, given the FHI program status j, 
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where the vector z indicate all of the exogenous price variables.   
In the first stage, the farmer decides whether to enroll in the FHI. If we substitute the 
optimal solutions of the second stage (Eq. (2)) and integrate over s, we can derive the 
indirect expected utility associated with FHI enrollment. Therefore, the first stage 
optimization problem is solved by comparing the expected utility of enrolling and not 
enrolling in the FHI (j=1 or j=0).  
(3)    { *, *, [ *( ), ]| } ( | ) jj EU U x H M s s K d s K π A =∫
If EUj=1 > EUj=0, the farmer chooses to enroll in the FHI.   
  This theoretical framework motivates our econometric analysis in two distinct 





proposed by McFadden (1989), and as a result, a binary discrete choice model is 
appropriate to model the FHI enrollment decision. Second, the theory suggests that 
the optimal land allocation and level of on- and off farm labor supply depends on the 
FHI participation decision. Therefore, the empirical model should be in accordance 
with the econometric literature of program evaluation. 
Data 
The primary dataset for our analysis is the Agricultural Census Survey in Taiwan in 
2005, conducted by the Directorate-general of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Taiwan. Since 1970, all farm households in 
Taiwan were interviewed every 5 years. The survey is designed to collect information 
on farm production practices and farm household activities. Each farm is asked to 
report on specific aspects of farm production , and on participation in the government 
programs during a face-to-face interview with officers of the local agricultural station 
(DGBAS 2005).
3 Data on socio-demographic characteristics of the farm operator and 
on-farm and off-farm activities are also collected.   
We use the most recent wave of these data, collected in 2005. The survey 
consists of 889,055 total households, of which, 771,579 are identified as agricultural 
farms; 68,398 are forest farms; and 49,078 are fishery farms. Since our primary 
 




interest is in the land and labor allocation of the farm households that are eligible to 
participate in the land retirement program, we limit our sample to only crop farms, 
thereby and excluding livestock farms, fishery and forest farms.   
  In order to obtain information on each person’s health insurance status, we 
merged the Agricultural Census to the administrative health claim profiles of all 
farmers enrolled in the FHI program in 2005. These data are maintained by the 
Bureau of Labor Insurance (BLI) of the Council of Labor Affairs in Taiwan and the 
data were merged using each participant’s personal identification number under the 
supervision of the Council of Labor Affairs and the Council of Agriculture. After 
deleting observations with missing values on certain important socio-demographic 
characteristics we arrive at a final sample of 703,287 farm operators.
4 
  Information of the on-farm hours of the farm operator are recorded in the 
Agricultural Census using an ordinal variable if the operator worked on-farm for 1-29, 
30-59, 60-89, 90-149, 150-179, 180-249, and  ≧250 days in 2005. We code these as 
discrete values 1-7 and model them using an ordered probit model. Four types of the 
off-farm jobs are documented our data. We assign the value 0 to those who did not 
 
4  Since only the personal identification number of the farm operator is documented in the Agricultural 
Census survey, we can only merge the farm operator data here.   15 
 
                                                      
work off the farm; 1 to those working off-farm for self-own other agricultural work
5; 
2 for self-own non agricultural job; 3 for hired agricultural work; 4 for hired 
non-agricultural work, respectively. In addition, the data contain the total number of 
hectares of land enrolled in the land retirement program, which is 0 for 
non-participants. Finally, we create a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the farm 
operator enrolled in the FHI program in 2005, and is 0 otherwise.     
In accordance with previous studies on off-farm employment (e.g., Huffman 
and Lange, 1989; Lim-Applegate et al., 2002; Ahearn et al., 2006; Phimister and 
Roberts, 2006), and health insurance coverage of the farm households (e.g., Gripp and 
Ford 1997; Liao and Taylor 2010), we create several variables to measure the human 
capital of the farm operators and capture household and farm characteristics. We 
defined to indicate if the farm operator is less than 40, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and  ≧70 
years old, four dummy variables to indicate educational attainment at the primary, 
junior high school, senior high school, or college level, and a dummy variable to 
identify gender. We also create a variable to measure household size. Finally, we 
create variables to control for farm characteristics, including dummy variables to 
indicate whether the farm size is are less than 0.25, 0.25-0.49, 0.5-0.74, and  ≧0.75 
 
5  Self-own other agricultural work is defined if the farms provide agricultural services with paid 
income for other farms. These activities could be providing pest prevention technology to others, seed 
breeding etc. hectares, a variable for total land area of the farm, and dummy variables to indicate 





We draw on the program evaluation literature to econometrically estimate the impact 
of FHI enrollment on the on-farm and off-farm employment of farm operators, and 
land enrolled in the land retirement program (Woodridge 2010). We use a matching 
technique to pair FHI enrollees with comparable non-enrollees. Using this matched 
sample, we then estimate several discrete choice models to analyze the effect of health 
insurance coverage through the FHI on labor supply and land enrolled in the land 
retirement program while controlling for nonrandom selection into the 
program. Matching  
i
Consistent with the theoretical framework, if the variable yi representing the outcome 
variable (i.e. on-farm, off-farm labor supply, and land enrollment), the equation of 
interests can be specified as: 
(9)   ii i yX H β γε =++  
where Hi is a binary indicator of the health insurance coverage through the FHI, and 
Xi is the vector of other exogenous variables.  , β γ are estimated parameters, and  i ε is 
the random error. We are primarily interested in the parameter  γ , which measures 
the impact of FHI enrollment on the outcome variable. However, a direct estimation 17 
 
of Eq. (9) using the conventional ordinary least square method (if yi is continuous) 
will yield biased estimation if the FHI enrollment and the outcome are correlated due 
to some unobserved common factors. To correct for the endogeneity problem, several 
methodologies have been proposed, including control function approach, instrumental 
variables, and matching (Wooldridge 2010).   
  Matching is a nonparametric method used to correct for endogeneity bias in 
observational studies where individuals have not been randomly assigned to treatment 
and control groups. The key goal of matching is to prune observations from the data 
so that the remaining data have better balance between the treated and control groups, 
meaning that the empirical distributions of the covariates (Xi) in the groups are more 
similar. Several algorithms had been proposed for matching. The Exact Matching 
method simply matches a treated unit to all of the control units with the same 
covariate values. Although the idea of this method is straightforward, this method 
often produces very few matches. 
As an alternative, several other approximate matching methods specify a metric 
to find control units that are close to the treated unit. This metric is often the 
Mahalanobis distance or the propensity score, which is simply the probability of being 
treated, conditional on the covariates. A problem with this approach is that it requires 
the user to set the size of the matching solution ex ante, then check for balance ex post 18 
 
(Guo and Fraser 2011; Wooldridge 2010).   
  We employ a matching method called “Coarsened Exact Matching” (CEM), 
which was recently suggested by Iacus et al. (2008). The advantage of CEM is that it 
is straightforward and easy to implement. Also, it belongs to the monotonic imbalance 
method. Implementing CEM requires several steps. First, variables are recoded into 
coarsened categories so that similar values are grouped together. In what follows, an 
"exact matching" algorithm is applied to the coarsened data (see Iacus et al. 2008 for 
the detailed procedure).   
  With the matched sample, the effects of self-selection into the FHI are greatly 
reduced. Therefore, for the case of a continuous outcome variable yi, the average 
treatment effect is simply the differences in mean values between the enrollees and 
non-enrollees in the matched sample. In our case, we apply several discrete choice 
models to estimate the treatment effect due to the nature of the outcome variables. 
Since the off-farm employment is recorded as an ordinal variable, we sue the ordered 
probit model, and estimate a multimonial logit model for the off-farm job category. 
Finally, we estimate a tobit model using land enrolled in the land retirement program. 
All of these three models are specified without any covariates (but a constant) and a 
dummy indicator for health insurance coverage (Hi) in the matched sample.   
Statistical Tests for the Matching Quality To assess the quality of matches in the matches sample one can compare the 
descriptive statistics of the matching variables in both the treatment and the control 
group, before and after matching. A more formal method of comparison is based on 













Lfg f g =− ∑ , 
which is the sum of absolute differences over all cells of a multivariate histogram. In 
Eq. (10),
1... k ll f denote the relative frequencies of the categorical variables for the 
treated farms, and  for the control farms. These frequencies are obtained in three 
steps. First, the number of categories for each (continuous) variable is chosen. Then, 
the discrete variables are cross-tabulated separately for the treated and the control 
group. Finally, the k-dimensional relative frequency is computed. Perfect balance 
across all variables is achieved if 
1... k ll g
(,) 0 Lfg= , whereas  (,)1 Lfg=  indicates  perfect 
separation. Letting the relative frequencies of the matched dataset be denoted by f* 
and g*, one hopes to find  . This difference can be 
interpreted as the increase in balance achieved as a result of matching. The measure 
defined in Eq. (10) can also be quantified for each variable j separately, allowing an 
assessment of the variable-specific imbalance. 
( , ) ( f g L f − *, *) 0 LL g Δ= >
Results 




employment. Overall,, 61% of the farm operators participated in the FHI. Among the 
insured farm operators, 20% of them work on-farm between 1-29 days, 23% of them 
between 30-59 days, and only 10% of them work for more than 250 days. In addition, 
71% of them did not work off-farm in 2005. For those who worked off the farm, the 
largest proportion worked for hire in a non-agricultural job (13%). A different pattern 
is revealed for the non-FHI enrolled farmers. Compared to their counterparts of 
enrollees they spent less time on their farm; only 7% of them work on farm for more 
than 250 days. A different pattern is also found for off-farm employment. Among the 
non-enrollees, 44% did not work off the farm. For those who had off-farm jobs, a 
large proportion worked for hire in the non-agricultural sector (35%).   
  Table 2 presents the sample distribution of the land allocated to the land 
retirement program by FHI status. FHI participation seems to be negatively correlated 
with the land enrolled in the land retirement program. As exhibited, the percentages of 
the enrollees and non-enrollees participating in the land retirement program are 19% 
and 23%, respectively. However, conditional on participating in the land retirement 
program FHI farmer enrolled more land than non-FHI farmers (59.38 vs. 55.09 
hectares). 
  Table 3 contains sample statistics for farms and farm operator characteristics in 
the matched and unmatched samples. In the unmatched sample, significant differences 21 
 
in the socio-demographic characteristics, farm practices and family structure are 
found between the enrollees and non-enrollees. Farm operators in the FHI tend to be 
older and less educated. For instance, the proportions of the farm operators who are 
older than 70 years old are 0.34 and 0.20 for the enrollees and non-enrollees, 
respectively. In addition, 58% of FHI farm operators finished elementary school, but 
only 44% of non-enrollees had this same level of educational attainment. Enrollees 
also have larger farms than their counterparts; 33% of enrollees had farms greater than 
0.75 acre, but only 29% of non-enrollees had farms this large. However, we find few 
differences by farm types.   
Investigation of Match Quality 
  After applying the CEM matching procedure on the unmatched sample, we 
constructed a matched sample based on selected categories of the exogenous variables. 
The sample statistics of the matched sample are shown in the Table 3. In the matched 
sample, we retain 427,702 enrollees and 273,488 non-enrollees. As expected, the 
sample statistics of the exogenous variables are very similar between the enrollee and 
non-enrollee subgroups in the matched sample. To provide more formal statistical 
evidence of the quality of the matched sample, we present the differences in sample 
statistics between the unmatched and matched sample in Table 4. 
In the unmatched sample, we find noticeable differences across age and 22 
 
education, with the L statics of 0.238, and 0.158 respectively. However, the L statics 
of all of the selected coared groups of the exogenous variables are less than 0.001. 
Consistent with the sample statistics presented in Table 3, the differences in these 
selected variables between enrollees and non-enrollees are much lower in the matched 
sample.   
Determinants of FHI enrollment  
We first investigated the association between socio-demographic characteristics of the 
farm operators, farm practices and family structure and participation in the FHI 
program using a Probit model. The estimated reported in Table 5 show that operator 
age is positively associated with the likelihood of participation in the FHI program. 
Compared to the farm operators who are <=40 years old, those farm operators whose 
age are >=70, 60-69 have higher probabilities of participating in FHI by 24.2% and 
20.5%, respectively. The positive effect of operator age on health insurance coverage 
is consistent with the findings from the U.S (Gripp and Ford 1997). In addition, 
compared to female farm operators, male farmers have a higher likelihood of FHI 
participation by 6%. The education level of the farm operator also matters for FHI 
coverage. For instance, compared to those who have only primal education, farmers 
who finished college have a 7.4% lower probability of FHI enrollment.   
  Farm and family characteristics also play an important role in FHI participation. 23 
 
An additional member in the household decreased the probability of FHI participation 
by 1.6%. Compared to the small farms, farms with land area greater than 0.75, 
0.5-0.74, and 0.25-0.5 acres have higher probabilities of the FHI participation by 
6.2%, 4.6%, and 4.1%, respectively. Finally, farm type is also related to FHI 
participation. Compared to other crop farms, rice, vegetable, and fruit farms have 
higher likelihood of FHI participation.   
Impact of FHI enrollment on labor and land allocation 
  Table 6 presents the estimation results for our models of on-farm work days by 
farm operators. Since on-farm work days is coded as an ordinal dependent variable 
(see Table 1), we estimate the impact of FHI enrollment on this variable using an 
ordered probit model containing only a constant term and the binary indicator of the 
FHI program participation. This is because differences in the exogenous variables are 
eliminated in the matched sample..   
The marginal effect estimates suggest that FHI enrollment is positively 
associated with on-farm days of the farm operator. Compared to the non-enrollees, the 
likelihood of working on the farm more than 250 days, 180-249 days, and 150-179 
days is higher by 2.4%, 1.6%, and 1.8% for the insured farmers, respectively. For the 
sake of comparison, the estimation results on the unmatched sample are also 
presented. It is evident that the results are upwardly biased without controlling for the 24 
 
differences in exogenous variables (i.e. in the unmatched sample).   
  In Table 7 we report the coefficients and the marginal effects of the multinomial 
logit model for off-farm job type. In general, the results indicate that FHI enrollment 
is negatively associated with the likelihood that farm operators work off the farm. 
Compared to non-enrollees, the probability that FHI farm operators work off-farm for 
hired non-agricultural work, and self-own non-agricultural work, are lower by 12% 
and 2.7%, respectively. Comparing the results across the unmatched and matched 
sample suggests the impact of FHI participation on off-farm employment is 
over-estimated using the unmatched sample. This is similar to the case of on-farm 
employment (Table 6). In the case of farm operators that work off the farm in 
self-own non-agricultural work for instance, the estimated marginal effects is -0.046, 
which is 70% higher than the effect estimated in the matched sample (-0.027). 
A positive (negative) effect of the FHI on the on(off) farm labor supply may 
reflect the life time choice of the farm operators. As indicated earlier, FHI covers 
several fridge benefits. One of the benefits is the old farm pension for the enrollees 
who are older than 65. For the older farm operators, a lump-sum payment of NT$ 
6,000 will be paid in each month. These subsidies are likely to be used to support their 
living and used for retirement. Therefore, the enrollees are less likely to work off the 
farm.  25 
 
  In Table 8 we report Tobit estimates of the impact of FHI enrollment on the 
amount of land allocated to the land retirement program. FHI enrollment is negatively 
correlated with both the likelihood that land is put into retirement as well as the   
level of land enrolled in the program. Compared to the non-enrollees, the enrollees 
have a lower probability of participating in the land retirement program by 2.7%. The 
unconditional marginal effects show that the enrollment in the land retirement 
program by FHI enrollees is 2.121 acre less than non-FHI enrollees. 
In contrast to the previous findings, these effects are under-estimated in the 
unmatched sample. There are several explanations for the negative association 
between enrolled land and the FHI participation. To be eligible for the FHI program, 
one of the requirements is that farmers must have at least 0.1 hectares of farm land, as 
so small farmers in particular are constrained in the amount of land they can retire if 
they wish to maintain eligibility for the FHI.   
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Using a unique dataset we examine the impact of participation in Farmers' 
Health Insurance program on the on-farm and off-farm employment and land 
allocation to the land retirement program of farmers in Taiwan. Despite the fact that 
all farmers are eligible for the FHI only 61% choose to enroll in it. Enrollees and 
non-enrollees appear to vary in their socio-demographic profiles. In particular, 26 
 
farmers who are older, male, and less educated are more likely to enroll in the FHI 
program. The results we obtained using a matching procedure to account for 
non-random enrollment in the program suggest that FHI enrollees are more(less) 
likely to work on(off) the farm. Moreover, FHI-insured farmers tend to enroll less 
land in the land retirement program.   
Based on our findings, it may be possibly conclude that although the FHI 
alleviates barriers of the farmers to access medical services and to provide social 
security under a modest cost-sharing mechanism, it has undesired effects on land and 
labor allocation of the farmers. In particular, the supplement old pension benefits of 
the program provides an incentive for older farmers to stay in the program, which 
could be beneficial if doing so increases their welfare and makes them less reliant on 
social services, but could be undesirable if they are less productive than the younger 
farms who would replace them. 
Given some of the similarities between the FHI program in Taiwan and certain 
aspects of PPACA, such as the ability for self-employed farms to purchase health 
insurance at subsidized rates, we can use the results of our analysis to predict how 
PPACA might affect U.S. farmers. Currently, many U.S. farmers, or their spouses, 
work off- farm to obtain fringe benefits that include health insurance. Our results 
suggest that universal access to health insurance, coupled with the premium and 27 
 
cost-sharing subsidies that will be available to the majority of farmers may reduce 
off-farm labor hours and increase on-farm hours. In addition, PPACA may reduce the 
amount of land allocated to the Conservation Reserve Program. This may be 
particularly true for older farmers who are still too young to qualify for Medicare 
benefits. In addition, PPACA may reduce the amount of land allocated to the 
Conservation Reserve Program. 
However, several limitations of our study must be kept in mind that may affect 
the generalizability of our results. While the FHI also contains maternity, disability, 
and life insurance benefits, and a pension for those over-65, PPACA is focused on the 
provision of health insurance. As a result, the effects we observe of FHI enrollment in 
Taiwan may be larger than should be expected to occur as a result of PPACA in the 
U.S. Finally, it should be noted that our dataset is cross section, and does not allow us 
to consider dynamic aspects of labor supply and land allocation decisions. This issue 
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Table 1: Sample distribution of the on and off farm days by health insurance status 
FHI enrollee  Yes  No 
Sample (%)  428,677 (61%)  274,610 (39%)
Code  Category of on-farm days 
1  If 1-29 days    86,863 (20%)  77,871 (28%)
2  If 30-59 days  100,407 (23%)  70,732 (26%)
3  If 60-89 days  64,444 (15%)  41,741 (15%)
4  If 90-149 days  54,653 (13%)  29,207 (11%)
5  If 150-179 days  47,049 (11%)  22,028 (8%)
6  If 180-249 days  33,092 (8%)  14,494 (5%)
7  If >=250 days    42,169 (10%)  18,537 (7%)
Code  Category of off-farm work           
0    If don't work off the farm  303,162 (71%)  119,803 (44%)
1    If works off-farm for self own agricultural work  32,398 (8%)  22,931 (8%)
2    If works off-farm for self own non-agricultural work  24,499 (6%)  27,196 (10%)
3    If works off-farm for hired agricultural work  11,476 (3%)  7,562 (3%) 
4    If works off-farm for hired non-agricultural work  57,142 (13%)  97,118 (35%)




Table 2: Sample distribution of land enrolled in the land retirement program 
FHI enrollee  Yes  No 
If participated in the land set-aside program (=1)  0.19    0.23   
(0.39) (0.42) 
Land enrolled in the set-aside program (are)  8.67    9.59   
(30.36) (32.99) 
Enrolled land for program participants only (are)  59.38    55.09   
    (57.48) (61.20) 
(.) are standard deviations. 1 hectare=100 are. 
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Table 3: Sample statistics of the exogenous variables 
        Full sample Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
FHI enrollee  --  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Sample      703,287 428,677 274,610    427,702 273,488 
Variable Definition  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 
  Age40  If  operator  age  <40  (=1)  0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.06    0.23 0.03    0.16 0.03 0.16 
  Age4049  If operator age >=40 and <50 (=1)  0.15  0.36  0.11  0.32  0.20   0.40  0.11   0.32  0.11  0.32 
  Age5059  If operator age >=50 and <60 (=1)  0.25  0.43  0.20  0.40  0.32   0.47  0.20   0.40  0.20  0.40 
  Age6069  If operator age >=60 and <70 (=1)  0.28  0.45  0.32  0.47  0.22   0.42  0.32   0.47  0.32  0.47 
  Age70  If  operator  age  >=70  (=1)  0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.20    0.40 0.34    0.47 0.34 0.47 
Education 
  Primal  If operator had no education (=1)  0.11  0.32  0.12  0.33  0.10   0.30  0.12   0.33  0.12  0.33 
  Elementary  If operator finished elementary school (=1)  0.53  0.50  0.58  0.49  0.44   0.50  0.58   0.49  0.58  0.49 
  Junior  If operator finished junior high school (=1)  0.17  0.37  0.15  0.35  0.20   0.40  0.15   0.35  0.15  0.35 
  Senior  If operator finished senior high school (=1)  0.15  0.36  0.12  0.32  0.20   0.40  0.12   0.32  0.12  0.32 
  College  If operator had college degree or higher (=1)  0.05  0.21  0.03  0.18  0.07   0.25  0.03   0.18  0.03  0.18 
Farm land 
  Land1  If operated land <0.25 hectare (=1)  0.24  0.43  0.22  0.42  0.27   0.45  0.22   0.42  0.22  0.42 
  Land2  If operated land >=0.25 and <0.50 hectare (=1)  0.27  0.44  0.27  0.44  0.27   0.45  0.27   0.44  0.27  0.44 
  Land3  If operated land >=0.50 and <0.75 hectare (=1)  0.17  0.38  0.18  0.38  0.17   0.37  0.18   0.38  0.18  0.38 
  Land4  If operated land >=0.75 hectare (=1)  0.31  0.46  0.33  0.47  0.29   0.45  0.33   0.47  0.33  0.47 
Farm type 
  Rice  If  rice  farms  (=1)  0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.47    0.50 0.46    0.50 0.46 0.50 
 Vegetable  If  vegetable  farms  (=1)  0.16  0.37  0.15  0.36  0.17   0.37  0.15   0.36  0.15  0.36 
  Fruit  If  fruit  farms  (=1)  0.25 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.23    0.42 0.27    0.44 0.27 0.44 
  Other crop  If other crop farms (=1)  0.12  0.32  0.11  0.32  0.12   0.33  0.11   0.32  0.11  0.32 
HH size  Persons  living  in  the  household  4.34 2.27 4.22 2.26 4.52    2.27 4.21    2.25 4.21 2.25 
Male  If  operator  is  male  (=1)  0.83 0.38 0.83 0.37 0.82    0.38 0.84    0.37 0.84 0.37 36 
 
Table 4: Statistics of the differences in the unmatched vs. matched sample 
Unmatched sample 




Age  0.238   0.525   0  1  1  1  0 
Male  0.013   0.013   0  0  0  0  0 
Education  0.158   -0.324   0  0  0  -1  0 
Farm  size  0.052   0.147   0  1  1  0  0 
HH.  size  0.087   -0.304   0  -1 0  0  0 
Farm  type     0.033   0.026   0  0  0  0  0 
Multivariate L1  0.270   
   Matched  sample   




Age 1.50E-13  -7.90E-13  0  0  0  0  0 
Male 3.80E-14  -2.10E-14  0  0  0  0  0 
Education 1.50E-13  -2.90E-13  0  0  0  0  0 
Farm size  1.50E-13  -7.90E-13  0  0  0  0  0 
HH. size  1.70E-13  -4.80E-13  0  0  0  0  0 
Farm  type     1.60E-13  -3.90E-13  0  0  0  0  0 
Multivariate L1  1.65E-13                        
The Coarsed Matching Method (CEM) is used for matching procedure. 37 
 
 
Table 5: Probit model of FHI enrollment 
   Coefficient  SE  Marginal  Effect SE 
Age4049  0.096  *** 0.014  0.022  *** 0.003   
Age5059  0.134  *** 0.014  0.031  *** 0.003   
Age6069  0.930  *** 0.014  0.205  *** 0.003   
Age70  1.119  *** 0.015  0.242  *** 0.003   
Male  0.249  *** 0.007  0.060  *** 0.002   
Elementary  0.298  *** 0.009  0.070  *** 0.002   
Junior  0.148  *** 0.012  0.035  *** 0.003   
Senior -0.015  0.012  -0.004  0.003   
College  -0.303  *** 0.015  -0.074  *** 0.004   
Land2  0.174  *** 0.007  0.041  *** 0.002   
Land3  0.200  *** 0.008  0.046  *** 0.002   
Land4  0.267  *** 0.007  0.062  *** 0.002   
HH  size  -0.069  *** 0.001  -0.016  *** 0.000   
Rice  0.026  *** 0.008  0.006  *** 0.002   
Vegetable  0.024  ** 0.010  0.006  ** 0.002   
Fruit  0.256  *** 0.009  0.060  *** 0.002   
Constant -0.469  ***  0.019 
Log-likelihood -444,924   






Table 6: Marginal effects from the on-farm days equation 








1  If 1-29 days  -0.080 ***  0.001  -0.055 ***  0.001 
2  If 30-59 days  -0.029 ***  0.000  -0.022 ***  0.000 
3  If 60-89 days  0.009 ***  0.000  0.005 ***  0.000 
4  If 90-149 days  0.021 ***  0.000  0.014 ***  0.000 
5  If 150-179 days  0.026 ***  0.000  0.018 ***  0.000 
6  If 180-249 days  0.022 ***  0.000  0.016 ***  0.000 
7  If >=250 days  0.033 ***  0.000  0.024 ***  0.000 
Log-likelihood      -1,292,047   -1,298,775  
Estimated using an ordered probit model. 
The definition of each value code can be also found in Table 1. 
The estimated equation is on-farm days= f (FHI) 




Table 7: Estimation of the off-farm work equations 
Use unmatched sample 
Code  Type of off-farm work  Variable  Coefficient SE Marginal effect SE
0    If do not work off-farm  -- 0.271  0.001 
1    If self-own other agricultural work  FHI  -0.535 *** 0.010  -0.004 ***  0.001 
Constant -1.773 *** 0.008 
2    If self own non-agricultural work  FHI  -1.036 *** 0.009  -0.046 ***  0.001 
Constant -1.392 *** 0.006 
3    If for hired agricultural work  FHI  -0.511 *** 0.015  -0.001 **  0.000 
Constant -2.763 *** 0.012 
4    If for hired non-agricultural work  FHI  -1.459 *** 0.006  -0.220 ***  0.001 
Constant -0.210 *** 0.004 
Log-likelihood -762,559 
            Use matched sample 
Code  Type of off-farm work  Variable  Coefficient SE Marginal effect SE
0    If do not work off-farm  -- 0.151 ***  0.001 
1    If self-own other agricultural work  FHI  -0.300 *** 0.011  -0.004 ***  0.001 
Constant -2.009 *** 0.009 
2    If self own non-agricultural work  FHI  -0.602 *** 0.010  -0.027 ***  0.001 
Constant -1.826*** 0.008 
3    If for hired agricultural work  FHI  -0.224 *** 0.017  0.000  0.000 
Constant -3.050 *** 0.014 
4    If for hired non-agricultural work  FHI  -0.883 *** 0.007  -0.120 ***  0.001 
Constant -0.786 *** 0.005 
Log-likelihood -737,671                
Estimated by the multinomial logit model 
FHI is the binary indicator of the health insurance program. 
The value code 0 is used for the reference group in estimation 
***, ** indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% level. 40 
 
Table 8: Estimation of the retired land equations 
    Unmatched sample 
Coefficients Marginal  Effect 
Unconditional Probability 
   Est.   SE  Est.   SE  Est.   SE
FHI  -10.989 ***  0.416  -1.721 ***  0.066    -0.023 ***  0.001 
Constant -112.305  0.461 
sigma 116.785  2.953 
log-likelihood -866,009 
    Matched sample 
Coefficients Marginal  Effect 
       Unconditional  Probability 
   Est.   SE  Est.   SE  Est.   SE
FHI  -13.425 ***  0.519  -2.121 ***  0.084    -0.027 ***  0.001 
Constant -113.523  1.138 
sigma 119.845  9.927 
Log-likelihood -868,656                      
Estimated by the tobit model. The dependent variable is the land enrolled in the set-aside program.   
FHI is a binary indicator of the health insurance program. 
*** indicate the significance at the 1% level.   